Federal-State Environmental Agency Relationships: A Weak Confederacy by Haines, Douglas P.
FEDERAL-STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS: 
A WEAK CONFEDERACY 
Douglas P. Haines 
AUTHORS: Executive Director and Founder, Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest. 264 N. Jackson Street, Athens, Georgia 30601. 
REFERENCE: Proceedings of the 1999 Georgia Water Resources Conference, held March 30 and 31, 1999, atthe University of Georgia. 
Kathryn J. Hatcher, editor, Institute ofEcology, The University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602-2202. 
Abstract. The relationship between state and federal 
environmental agencies has changed significantly over the 
last several years as concepts of "devolution" and increased 
local control have gained increasing political force. The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) no 
longer speaks in terms of strong federal environmental 
authority, but discusses state-federal relationships in terms 
of "partnerships" and "win-win" situations. States, 
including Georgia, regularly express their unwillingness to 
undertake environmental programs and responsibilities 
which are not uniformly required of all states. As a result, 
the relationship between federal and state agencies, and 
their respective roles in responding to water quality issues 
has become less clear. Citizens must play an increasingly 
important role in overseeing the actions of the 
environmental agencies, and must push for state-federal 
agreements, including Performance Partnership Agreements 
(PP A), which state with particularity the respective roles of 
state and federal environmental agencies. 
A RECENT IIlSTORY OF FEDERAL-STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY RELATIONSIIlPS 
The environmental community expressed cautious 
optimism at the election of Bill Clinton in 1992. ·Many 
believed that the incoming administration would begin to 
reassert more federal authority over the nation's 
environmental laws and reverse the twelve-year trend of 
diminishing federal control which had characterized 
state/federal relationships during the administrations of 
Presidents Reagan and Bush. The level of optimism in 
Georgia increased when Carol Browner was named as 
Administrator, and evenmore so when John Hankinson was 
named as Region IV Administrator. The regulated 
community and states, evidently anticipating amajor change 
in EP A's role, appeared resigned to accepting a stronger 
federal role in environmental protection. At the beginning 
of the Clinton/Browner/Hankinson era, EPA appeared 
poised to take a more prominent position vis-a-vis the 
states, yet also offered to engage in dialogue with states 
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regarding potential partnerships, and increased roles for the 
public in environmental decisionmaking. The prospects for 
strong, comprehensive federal/state/public agreements were 
good, with the administration flexing its new-found muscle, 
yet offering to seek middle ground at the same time. 
The mid-term elections of 1994 brought an end to 
Democratic control of the House and Senate, and also to the 
willingness of state and regulated communities to find a 
compromise position on the exercise of federal 
environmental authority. The "RepublicanRevolution" also 
brought a halt to any hope that EPA would exert strong 
federal control over Clean Water Act issues. Instead, EPA 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) began to warn 
pro-environment litigants that citizen suit activity under 
federal environmental laws might cause the Republican 
Congress to severely weaken major environmental laws, 
including the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species 
Act. Litigants in Georgia and several other states were 
warned that their attempts to enforce Total Maximum Daily 
Load (TMDL) provisions under Clean Water Act §303 
might cause Congress to weaken or eliminate the TMDL 
provisions because, EPA feared, Congress might consider 
the TMDL provisions to be "unfunded mandates." While 
TMDL litigants in Georgia, and nationwide generally were 
not dissuaded from going forward, several national 
environmental groups refrained from litigating Endangered 
Species Acts claims after they convinced themselves that 
pursuing ESA claims would give rise to "takings" alarms, 
and cause Congress to eliminate the Act altogether. So, on 
several environmental fronts, environmental organizations 
joined EPA in a culture of environmental activism atrophy. 
In essence, the EPA and many in the environmental 
community had decided that the rule for enforcing certain 
environmental laws was: "Don't use them or you'll lose 
them. [Notably, congress failed in efforts to weaken 
environmental laws, and in the next two election cycles, 
American voters from all political persuasions sent 
Washington a clear message that the American voters will 
not support weakening of federal environmental laws.] 
At the national level, EPA signaled its unwillingness to 
take a stronger federal role in enforcing federal 
environmental laws. Instead, EPA pushed for cooperative 
and "stakeholder" solutions, including such promising 
programs as Project XL and the Common Sense Initiative. 
However, with EPA no longer willing to flex its federal 
muscle for fear of offending states' rights-oriented 
governors and entrenched heads of state environmental 
agencies, EPA marched forward through much of this 
decade armed only with carrots, . but little visible stick. 
Industry, and prospective state partners exhibited no great 
willingness to find environmental middle ground so long as 
they did not perceive EPA as a powerful enforcement threat. 
Georgia EPD and other state environmental agencies 
refused to undertake environmental protection programs 
unless EPA specifically required every state to undertake a 
similar program. So, as EPA remained essentially silent 
about state agency responsibilities, Georgia EPD refused to 
devote resources to new programs, including the TMDL 
program. 
CITIZEN ACTION STIMULATES EPA EXERCISE OF 
FEDERAL AUTHORJTY 
The Georgia environmental community took several 
steps which moved EPA into a more active role in Georgia 
water quality issues. 1) EPA was convinced to get involved 
in several high profile CW A citizen suits; 2) Georgia's 
delegated authority to carry out the NPDES permitting 
program was challenged by a withdrawal petition and by 
federal court order; and 3) EPA was forced to accept 
specific programmatic and oversight functions as a result of 
the Georgia TMDL lawsuit. 
First, EPA was convinced to take enforcement action in 
several high profile CW A citizen suits where Georgia EPD 
had failed to diligently prosecute facilities with long 
histories of NPDES violations and/or where Georgia EPD 
had failed to resolve longstanding environmental problems. 
In several citizen actions~ which received high levels of 
media attention (only three are specifically identified here), 
EPA agreed to accept a stronger enforcement role. EP A's 
entrance on the scene usually stirs action by Georgia EPD. 
The most notable example was EPA's decision to bring an 
enforcement action regarding the City of Atlanta's sewage 
treatment system. EP A's involvement (EPA brought 
Georgia EPD along in the investigation as well) was 
stimulated by the tremendous media attention generated by 
Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund et al. v City of 
Atlanta (N.D.Ga 1:95-CV-2550-TWT). This 1995 case 
involved longstanding and egregious CW A violations by the 
City of Atlanta where Georgia EPD enforcement had been 
ineffective. Similarly, in 1998, EPA brought suit to address 
longstanding land application system (LAS) problems of 
Dalton Utilities in, United States v. Dalton Utilities, 
(N.D.Ga. 4:98-CV-191-HLM )(pending case). EPA filed 
suit (and Georgia EPD followed) after the Georgia Center 
for Law in the Public Interest and the State of Alabama filed 
notices of intent to sue. Also in 1998, EPA was convinced 
to take indirect federal oversight action related to the 
pending case of Sierra Club v Georgia Power, (M.D. Ga. 
5:97-CV-78-3(HL) (11th Cir. Case No. 98-901l)(cases 
pending in District Court and Court of Appeals). EPA 
requested that Georgia EPD retract a proposed NPDES 
permit after citizen suit litigants presented a compelling 
case that Georgia EPD's proposed NPDES permit could not 
rectify environmental problems. EPA's intervention (and 
expected permitmodifications by GeorgiaEPD) is expected 
to finally require Georgia Power to install heat reduction 
technology, which had never been required by Georgia EPD 
despite sannual exceedances of permit temperature limits in 
22 of 23 years that the facility had been permitted by 
Georgia EPD. Absent citizen action, it is unlikely that EPA 
(and then, Georgia EPD) would have gotten involved in the 
Georgia Power, City of Atlanta, and Dalton Utilities cases. 
Federal action and state response has also been 
stimulated by the environmental community's threats to 
strip Georgia EPD of its delegated NPDES permitting 
authority under the CW A In 1997, the Southern 
Environmental Law Center (SELC) filed a petition to 
decertify Georgia's program based on a number of alleged 
failings by Georgia EPD, including failure to carry out 
TMDL responsibilities, inadequate permitting, lack of 
stormwater programs, and inadequate public participation 
in agency decisionmaking. If EPA were to accept the 
allegations and withdraw Georgia's certification to carry out 
the NPDES program, EPA would be required to take over 
sole responsibility for the Georgia program. Not 
surprisingly, EPA is less than anxious to take over a state 
program, and thus, has never completely granted a 
decertification petition. ·However, EP A's fear of having a 
state program land in its lap caused EPA to take a more 
.active role in convincing Georgia EPD to alter its NPDES 
program to better carry out CW A responsibilities. While 
decertification petitions have provided indirect leverage 
against intransigent states, a court order in the Georgia 
TMDL case made clear that Georgia EPD stood on the cusp 
ofhaving its NPDES program withdrawn by a federal court. 
The court ruled that, [i]f the State refuses to implement 
TMDLs through the NPDES process, EPA shall withdraw 
certification of the State NPDES program, pursuant to 
CWA § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) and 40 CFR § 
123 .63( a)( 5) (withdrawal permitted where the State has not 
"develop[ed] an adequate regulatory program for 
developing water-quality based effluent limits in NPDES 
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permits"). Sierra Club v Hankinson, 939 F.Supp. 872, 874 
(N.D.Ga. 1996). 
The Georgia TMDL suit has also had a profound effect 
in forcing EPA to take a more active role in overseeing and 
compelling CWA compliance by Georgia EPD. The 
statutory framework of the Clean Water act provides EPA 
with an oversight function to ensure that states cany out 
their delegated responsibilities. The Court acknowledged 
that states with delegated programs are primarily 
responsible for carrying out the CWA, yet found that "the 
[CWA] requires EPA to step in when states fail to fulfill 
their duties under the [CWA]." Sierra Club v Hankinson, 
939 F.Supp. 865, 871 (N.D.Ga. 1996). The Court found 
that the State had failed to cany out its TMDL 
responsibilities, and entered an order establishing a TMDL 
process backed by an assurance that EPA is ultimately 
responsible for completing each step in the process. Sierra . 
Club v Hankinson, 939 F.Supp. 872 (N.D.Ga. 1996). 
The Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest and 
EPA entered various settlement agreements and consent 
decrees which required EPA to accomplish certain tasks, 
most notably, developing TMDLs in entire river basins in 
accordance with a statewide rotating schedule. Each river 
basin has two deadlines for developing TMDLs; one 
deadline for the state, and, two months later, a deadline for 
EPA TMDL development in the event the state fails to meet 
its obligations. EPA fears that it might be saddled with an 
inordinate amount of the TMDL process work, and has an 
even greater fear that other states will similarly shunt their 
TMDL responsibilities to EPA. This fear can be expected 
to cause EPA to seek agreements with states that place the 
lion's share of TMDL responsibilities on states. Of course, 
such agreements will help to clarify federal-state 
relationships. 
The terms of the TMDL settlements and consent decrees 
require EPA to provide significant assistance to Georgia 
EPD, both in carrying out TMDL development 
responsibilities, and in reviewing and recommending 
improvements in Georgia's TMDL programs. EPA has, or 
will have completed by the date of publication of this 
article, reports and recommendations to Georgia EPD 
regarding CWA §303(d) listing procedures, design of 
§303(d)waterqualitymonitoringprograms, §303(d)listing 
requirements for toxic impaired waters, and an analysis and 
recommendations for addressing water quality problems 
from forestry activities. These EPA reports and 
recommendations establish concrete criteria by which 
Georgia EPD programs can be assessed. State agencies are 
often loathe to provide verifiable success benchmarks 
because state agencies recognize that such benchmarks 
provide an easy basis for federal oversight and enable the 
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public to assess the effectiveness of state programs. 
Benchmarks also provide a ready basis for citizens to take 
action to rectify easily verifiable agency shortcomings. The 
court-orderedEP A reports constitute a significant alteration 
of the typical federal-state relationship in that it is unlikely 
that these issues would have been addressed at a policy or 
technical level had there not been citizen suit enforcement 
of the Clean Water Act 
The Georgia TMDL process also alters 
federal-state-public relationships because court orders and 
legal agreements dictate specifically the roles that EPA and 
Georgia EPD must take. Citizens can be involved readily 
because agency responsibilities must be satisfied in 
predetermined locations, with precise requirements for 
agency tasks. This means citizens can watchdog agency 
activity, and, more importantly, participate in the TMDL 
process by adding their efforts to the planned agency 
activities. 
Although citizen action has been successful in 
facilitating a federal-state relationship which is more 
accountable to the public, and which better defines EP A's 
oversightresponsibilities, the relationship between EPA and 
Georgia EPD still requires significant clarification. 
THE PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
The Performance Partnership Agreement (PP A){these 
agreements were known as a "work agreements" before the 
verbage of compromise and conciliation dominated the 
federal-state vocabulary) should provide an effective 
mechanism for clarifying the respective roles and 
responsibilities ofEPA and GeorgiaEPD. The current PP A 
proposal (all discussion will reflect publicly available PPA 
drafts as ofJanuary 21, 1999) clarifies many aspects of the 
EPA-Georgia EPD relationship, and identifies specific 
program commitments of each agency. However, the PPA 
continues to reflect the historical propensity of EPA and 
Georgia EPD to maintain a relatively ill-defined 
relationship. 
One of the major shortcoming of the PPA is that neither 
EPA nor Georgia EPD appear fully committed to engaging 
the public in a dialogue about what the PP A should contain. 
While public participation was encouraged and facilitated, 
neither agency expressed any willingness to enter an 
ongoing dialogue regarding PP A issues, choosing instead to 
simply collect comments and make intra-agency decisions 
whether to ignore or incorporate suggested changes to the 
PP A. To their credit, EPA and Georgia EPD specifically 
provided for public participation in the 1999-00 PP A 
process, including sponsoring a meeting where the public 
could discuss a first draft of the PP A with representatives 
of both EPA and Georgia EPD. This was a great 
improvement over the previous PP A draft process, which 
initially provided for no public participation. At public 
request, a hearing ultimately was held for the previous PP A, 
and was attended by several EPA representatives who 
willingly responded to public concerns. However, many 
who attended the hearing expressed concern that the PPA 
drafting process might be little more than a perfunctory 
exercise, noting that Georgia EPD did not send a single 
representative to the only public meeting. 
The PP A will not achieve broad public acceptance until the 
public is brought in as an equal partner in a dialogue which 
includes EPA, Georgia EPD, and the public. 
The PP A is also deficient because it fails to state goals 
which are objective, quantifiable or measurable. According 
to the PPA, "[t]he long-term goal for the Water Protection 
Branch is to use the 1994-1995 305(b) report waters not 
fully supporting as a baseline and increase by I 0% the 
percentages of river miles, estuary acres, and lake acres 
fully supporting designated uses by the year 2005." This 
goal is not clear as to how it can be measured, or as to what 
must be accomplished to satisfy the goal; it uses an 
inadequate baseline for comparative purposes, and; it states 
a very unambitious goal which would require centuries to 
remediate existing water quality problems. 
The PP A also fails to specifically describe the oversight 
functions of EPA. This is particularly troubling regarding 
permitting and permit oversight. The fact that facially 
inadequate NPDES permits have been issued and then 
repeatedly reissued by Georgia EPD highlights the present 
inadequacy ofEPA's NPDES oversight. EPA must take a 
more active role in NPDES oversight, and EP A's 
responsibilities should be stated specifically in the PP A. 
Instead, the PP A uses vague terms which simply suggest 
that EPA will have an "effective" program, or that EPA will 
deal with problems "expeditiously," yet fails to defme what 
"effective" or "expeditious" means. Absent clear 
defmitions, the public has no clear guidance about what it 
has a right to expect from its environmental agencies. 
CONCLUSION 
The effectiveness of state environmental agencies 
depends in large part on strong leadership at the federal 
level by EPA. Absent leadership, technical assistance, 
policy guidance, and diligent oversight by EPA, some state 
agencies can be expected to neglect important water quality 
protection responsibilities. Citizen suits and other 
concerted citizen action can move EPA toward taking a 
stronger role vis-a-vis state agencies, but these actions alone 
cannot assure an effective federal-state relationship. 
Ultimately, this relationship must be governed by a 
comprehensive PP A which details the specific roles and 
responsibilities of federal and state environmental agencies. 
Such a PP A will never be created in Georgia until EPA, 
citizens, and Georgia EPD agree to work together in 
drafting such an agreement. 
412 
